The Necessity of Granting a Cause of Action to an Unborn Viable Fetus Under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Acts by McClelland, Regis Myles
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 21 Number 4 Article 8 
1983 
The Necessity of Granting a Cause of Action to an Unborn Viable 
Fetus Under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Acts 
Regis Myles McClelland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Regis M. McClelland, The Necessity of Granting a Cause of Action to an Unborn Viable Fetus Under the 
Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Acts, 21 Duq. L. Rev. 1017 (1983). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol21/iss4/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
The Necessity of Granting a Cause of Action to an
Unborn Viable Fetus Under the Pennsylvania
Wrongful Death and Survival Acts
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Pennsylvania wrongful death' and survival statutes,
a cause of action may not be maintained on behalf of an unborn
child who is negligently injured in utero and subsequently still-
born. This position was recently upheld in Scott v. Kopp,s where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a cause of action to the
parents of a stillborn child who died as a result of injuries received
en ventre sa mere in an automobile accident.4 The conservative
holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scott is contrary to
the overwhelming trend of state court authority which grants such
a cause of action.' The majority of jurisdictions have held that
1. The Pennsylvania death action statute states in applicable part: "An action may be
brought to recover damages for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or
neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another if no action for damages was brought
by the injured individual during his lifetime." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon
1982).
2. The Pennsylvania survival action statute provides the following: "All causes of ac-
tion or proceedings, real or personal, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defen-
dant, or the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants." Id. § 8302.
3. 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981). On May 27, 1976, Donna R. Scott, the plaintiff,
was operating an automobile in Montgomery County when she was injured in a head-on
collision which occurred when the defendant's automobile crossed the center of the highway.
Mrs. Scott was eight months pregnant. As a result of the collision, Mrs. Scott's child died in
utero on or about May 27, 1976, and was stillborn on May 29, 1976, after induced labor.
The survival act effective at the time of the Scott decision provided the following: "All
causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, except actions for slander or libel, shall
survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the death of one or more joint
plaintiffs or defendants." 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3371 (Purdon 1975) (amended 1978).
The wrongful death act effective at the time of the Scott decision stated the following:
Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit
for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the widow of any
such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives may maintain an
action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned.
Act of Apr. 15, 1851, § 19, 1851 Pa. Laws 669 (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8301 (Purdon 1982).
4. 494 Pa. at 488, 431 A.2d at 960.
5. The following cases support the view that a wrongful death and/or a survival action
is maintainable for the death of an unborn child: Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95,
300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966);
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where a fetus is viable, that is, capable of independent existence
apart from its mother, at the time of sustaining injuries resulting
in prenatal death, a wrongful death and/or a survival action for the
unborn child is maintainable. 6 These enlightened states have con-
ceded that the issue involves implications which cannot be resolved
by legal analysis alone. The viability of a fetus is solely a medical
determination. It is the recognition of the advanced state of the
medical profession, whereby viability can be ascertained with accu-
racy and assurance, which has obliged the majority of courts to
recognize life before birth. Pennsylvania, in contrast, is steadfast in
its assertion that live birth is the only reliable standard upon
which to base a cause of action.' It is the concept of viability,
purely the product of the sophisticated state of the art of medicine,
however, which beckons Pennsylvania courts to intervene and pro-
tect fetal rights by supplying a cause of action to the unborn child.
Courts having denied an unborn child a cause of action offer sev-
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Pickney v. Werner, No.
C.A. 1580-80 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar: 26, 1981); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d
100 (1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); Chrisafogeorgis v.
Bradenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277
N.E.2d 20 (1971); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285
S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); Wascom v. American Indemn. Corp., 383 So. 2d 1037 (La.
Ct. App. 1980); Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188
N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969);
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio
App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v.
Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I.
177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Moen v.
Hansen, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184
S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d
107 (1967); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92
(1980). See also Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, 15
RUTGERS L. REV. 61 (1960); Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579 (1965);
Comment, Wrongful Death and the Unborn: An Examination of Recovery After Roe v.
Wade, 13 J. FAM. L. 94 (1973-74); Comment, Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.: A Limited
Advance in the Law of Prenatal Wrongful Death, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669 (1976).
6. See supra note 5. Some states have both survival and wrongful death acts. Other
states have either a death act alone or a survival act. For purposes of this comment, it is not
necessary to distinguish between the two; rather it is sufficient to note that every state has a
statutory remedy for a wrongful death. No state court has found this distinction significant
in granting or denying a cause of action.
7. See C. GROBSTEIN, FROM CHANGE TO PURPOSE: AN APPRAISAL OF EXTERNAL HUMAN
FERTILIZATION 91-103 (1981); Fletcher, Indications of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of
Man, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1972, at 32; Lintgen, The Impact of Medical Knowledge
on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 566 & n.17 (1962).
8. Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 491, 431 A.2d 959, 961 (1981).
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eral reasons: lack of precedent; an unborn child is part of its
mother until birth and has no juridical existence; such a cause of
action would open the door to fraudulent claims, the proof of
which would be speculative and difficult; and the action should be
created by the legislature instead of being recognized by the
courts.' When properly analyzed, these arguments fail to rise to an
acceptable standard of legal reasoning and logic. The absurdity,
however, lies in the illogic of allowing a remedy to an infant born
alive who was injured prior to birth, but denying recovery for one
which was injured so severely that it died before birth. This is the
case in all those jurisdictions which deny a cause of action to a
viable fetus. The tortfeasor inflicting the greater injury should not
escape all liability because of this distinction. It is no more difficult
to prove the medical-legal causation of death-producing injury
than to prove prenatal injury to infants who survive birth, perhaps
momentarily, or to those who are born with disabling injuries.' 0
The inequity of the requirement of live birth is most disturbing:
The one who injures a fetus only enough to disable him must pay
for his tortious actions while the one who injures the fetus severely
enough to kill him does not."
It is the purpose of this comment to explore the inconsistencies
demonstrated by the reasoning of the various state courts as well
as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and to refute the arguments
set forth in support of denying the viable fetus a cause of action.
There is no legitimate reason for not permitting a cause of action
under the Pennsylvania wrongful death" and survival's statutes to
9. No court which denies a cause of action to a viable fetus adheres to just one of these
principles, but rather decides the question by considering all of the policy issues present.
The following cases support the view that a wrongful death action is not maintainable for
the death of an unborn viable fetus: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974);
Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977); Stokes v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa
1971); State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil
Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964);
Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969); Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959
(1981); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958); Nelson v. Peterson, 542
P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
See also Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Un-
born: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1401.
10. Robertson, supra note 9, at 1424 & n.134.
11. L. GLANTZ, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF FETAL ViABILITY, GENErics AND THE LAW 35 (A.
Milensky & G. Annas ed. 1976).
12. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1982).
13. Id. § 8302.
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the unborn child who is stillborn as a result of prenatal injuries.
Live birth is an arbitrary point from which to discern, acknowledge
or measure personhood."' The damages awarded under the wrong-
ful death and survival acts should be precisely the same for a child
who lives for one day as a child who is stillborn. There is no more
speculation involved in determining when injury occurred in the
case of an unborn child than there is for an infant born alive. Med-
ical expert testimony is available to verify the viability of the fetus
and causation, thereby eliminating questions of proof in establish-
ing the plaintiff's claim.
Denial of a cause of action is also in contradiction to other ac-
cepted tort principles. For example, Pennsylvania courts have con-
sistently granted causes of action to those plaintiffs whose
"chances of survival" have been terminated by the negligence of
another.' 5 A viable fetus negligently injured in utero and denied a
chance to live falls precisely within this category of plaintiffs.
Where are the court's objections? A viable unborn fetus is, in fact,
a biologically existing person and a living human being, because it
has reached such a stage of development that it can presently live
outside the female body as well as within it. 6 If no cause of action
is allowed, a wrong has been inflicted for which there is no remedy,
which is blatantly contrary to the traditional tort policy of the
common law.1
7
This comment will trace the history and development of recov-
ery for the unborn viable fetus under states' wrongful death and/or
survival actions. It will offer an analysis and comparison of state
court decisions discussing both sides of the issue and will reveal
the better reasoned opinions supporting a cause of action for the
unborn child. A critique will follow of the current Pennsylvania po-
sition as expressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scott v.
Kopp."s An examination of the courts' evolution of thought, an
14. See Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 491, 431 A.2d 959, 961 (1981). Justice Flaherty
admitted that the live birth requirement is arbitrary. Id.
15. Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978) (The court allowed expert
testimony to establish the causal relation between the harm suffered by the patient-plaintiff
and the alleged negligence of the doctor or hospital in failing to properly diagnose and treat
the plaintiff's condition. This failure increased the plaintiff's risk of physical harm and ter-
minated his chances of survival, thus the defendants may be held liable).
16. Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 444, 184 S.E.2d 428, 435 (1971). See supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
17. 155 W. Va. at 444, 184 S.E.2d at 435. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 901-02 (4th ed. 1971).
18. 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981).
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overview of the various states' decisions, and a criticism of Scott
will provide an understanding of the rationale underlying the pre-
sent contemporary trend to grant a cause of action for the wrong-
ful death of an unborn viable fetus.
II. HISTORY
There was no right of action for wrongful death under the com-
mon law. Actions for wrongful death and survival are strictly statu-
tory creations.1 9 Traditionally, courts have denied recovery for pre-
natal injuries regardless of prenatal status, because the unborn
child has never been considered a "person" under wrongful death
and survival statutes.2 0 The initial case to question the effect a
state's wrongful death statute had on fetal rights was the 1884 de-
cision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Dietrich
v. Inhabitants of Northampton.2 1
In Dietrich, a woman in her second trimester suffered a miscar-
riage as a result of a fall on a defective highway.2 2 The fetus died
shortly thereafter, but reportedly moved its limbs for several min-
utes. 3 In his opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., denied
the unborn child a cause of action, stating that the fetus was not a
"person" within the meaning of the Massachusetts wrongful death
statute, since the unborn child was part of its mother at the time
of injury.2 The court also relied upon lack of precedent and the
remoteness of damages as reasons for not granting a cause of ac-
tion.26 Such reasoning was followed for several years until the pro-
position that an unborn child was part of its mother was persua-
sively challenged in Illinois in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Boggs in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital2 6 The dissent argued that a
19. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 901-02.
20. See Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974); Justus v. Atchison, 19
Cal. 3d, 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla.
1977); McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W. 2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303,
204 A.2d 140 (1964); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E. 2d 382, cert. denied, 287
N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958);
Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
21. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 15.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id. at 15-16.
26. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (overruled in Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114
N.E.2d 412 (1953)). In Allaire, the unborn child was killed in utero as a result of a fall the
mother experienced in an elevator due to the defendant's negligence. The majority held that
an action may not be maintained because the child was still part of its mother. 184 Ill. at
1983 Fetal Rights 1021
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fetus must be regarded as a life distinct from that of its mother
when it reaches the prenatal stage of viability at which it could
survive if then separated from her.27
It was not until 1949, however, that the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota, in Verkennes v. Corniea,25 recognized the concept of viabil-
ity and founded a cause of action accruing to a viable unborn child
under the Minnesota wrongful death statute.29 In Verkennes, the
unborn child failed to survive birth due to the negligence of the
defendant in delivering the child.30 The court held that under their
wrongful death statute, the personal representative of an unborn
child, viable and capable of separate and independent existence,
whose death is caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant, may
maintain an action for the wrongful death on behalf of the next of
kin of the deceased child.3
Shortly thereafter, in 1954, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in
Rainey v. Horn,3 ' reversed a judgment in favor of a defendant phy-
sician where a child was born dead after a full term of pregnancy
and the death had allegedly resulted from the defendant's negli-
gence in attempting to deliver the child. 3 The Rainey court held
that an unborn child is a "person" after it reaches the prenatal age
of viability when the death of its mother does not necessarily cause
the death of the fetus, and when, if separated from its mother, the
fetus would be such a matured human being that it would live and
grow mentally and physically.3 4 If such a child dies before birth as
the result of the negligent act of another, an action may be main-
tained for its death under the Mississippi wrongful death statute. 5
Subsequent to these decisions, the trend has been to hold in ac-
cord with this view of viable human life. The majority of states
have held that under wrongful death statutes, an action may be
363, 56 N.E. at 640.
27. 184 Ill. at 367, 56 N.E. at 642. (Boggs, J., dissenting).
28. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). In Verkennes, the mother of the deceased
child and wife of the plaintiff had been pregnant and under the care of the defendant physi-
cian in connection with the delivery of the child. The mother died from a rupture of the
uterus during the labor and hemorrhage therefrom, thus resulting in the death of the un-
born viable fetus.
29. MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1947).
30. 229 Minn. at 366, 38 N.W.2d at 839.
31. Id. at 370-71, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
32. 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954).
33. Id. at 270, 72 So. 2d at 435 (the defendant doctor negligently tried to force the
birth of the baby before the plaintiff was in labor).
34. Id. at 274, 72 So. 2d at 439-40.
35. Id. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 1453 (1942).
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maintained by a personal representative of a viable unborn child
for the wrongful death of such child caused by injuries sustained
en ventre sa mere. 36 There is, however, contrary authority which
requires a child to be born alive before recovery is granted for pre-
natal injuries.3 7 The rationales and conclusions offered by various
courts differ greatly among the states. In order to reconcile the dis-
parity, it is necessary to examine the arguments advanced in sup-
port of these conflicting views.
III. COMPARISON OF STATE DECISIONS
A comparison of state court decisions brings to light certain ar-
guments which consistently reappear. Many courts supporting the
minority view denying a cause of action hold that a child is not a
"person" under the state's wrongful death and survival statutes.3 8
Since an unborn child is still part of its mother, according to these
courts, it is a matter for the legislature to expand the interpreta-
tion of "person" to include a viable fetus. Also often cited as rea-
sons for not granting a cause of action are the difficulties in prov-
ing causation and pecuniary loss, even though the majority of
states have concluded that evidentiary and damage problems are
not legitimate reasons for denying a proper cause of action.3 9 There
are still other court opinions which have held that a cause of action
on behalf of the stillborn child is simply to compensate the parents
for the emotional distress they suffer."0 This contention is in oppo-
sition to the majority view which holds that the resulting damages
are separate and distinct, as in the case of a postnatal child and its
mother. The same arguments are the subject of analysis in practi-
cally every state. For every reason offered to deny a cause of action
there is a more logical opinion rendered in favor of allowing
recovery.
The reason most frequently cited for not granting a cause of ac-
tion to a stillborn child negligently injured in utero is that a viable
unborn child is not a "person" within the meaning of the state's
wrongful death and/or survival statutes."' The Florida District
36. See supra note 5.
37. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 40-52 and accom-
panying text.
39. See infra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
1983 1023
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Court of Appeal in Duncan v. Flynn4 2 concluded that the legisla-
tive purpose of the wrongful death statute was to provide compen-
sation within the ordinary contemplation of persons who had been
born alive, and that since the fetus involved in the present case
had not been born alive, it was not a "person" and a wrongful
death action could not be maintained." Similarly, in Kilmer v.
Hicks," the Arizona Court of Appeals decided that the meaning of
the word "person" in their wrongful death statute was clear and
unambiguous in its non-inclusion of a viable fetus, and that it was
a matter for the legislature, and not the court, to expand the statu-
tory definition if it deemed it necessary.
The proposition that the legislature never intended wrongful
death statutes to apply to the deaths of viable unborn children is
erroneous and unpersuasive. Wrongful death statutes are remedial
in nature and should be broadly construed to effect their pur-
pose. 6 The courts have often seized upon the liberties afforded
them by the rules of statutory interpretation to grant the appropri-
ate causes of action.47 The instant situation is no exception. The
argument that a cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable
unborn child should be created by the legislature instead of being
recognized by the courts is particularly unconvincing in light of the
number of well-considered decisions which hold that such a child is
a "person" within the meaning of the state's wrongful death
statute.48
42. 342 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The fetus was viable and was apparently
full term at the time it died during the course of the defendant physician's unsuccessful
attempts at delivery. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 126.
44. 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974) (the plaintiff's wife was killed in an automo-
bile accident when she was more than nine months pregnant, thereby instantaneously kill-
ing the child).
45. Id. at 554, 529 P.2d at 708.
46. See Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354, (1974); Mone v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W.
Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14,
148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
47. See Rule of Strict and Liberal Construction, 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1928 (Pur-
don Supp. 1982-1983) which states in applicable part: "All other provisions of law shall be
liberally construed to effect their object and to promote justice." Id.
48. See Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Simmons
v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1
(1962); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); White v. Yup,
85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v.
Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431,
184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148
N.W.2d 107 (1967). See also Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (D.C. W. Va. 1969)
1024 Vol. 21:1017
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If it is within the power of the judiciary to interpret the word
"person" to include a viable fetus, why then does the controversy
exist? A majority of those courts which have held that it is an
overextension of their authority to grant a cause of action adhere
to the antiquated notion that an unborn child is still part of its
mother and as such has no juridical existence until birth.4 9 This
philosophy is in direct opposition to the more contemporary view
which recognizes a viable fetus as having a legal being and a legal
personality distinct from that of its mother. 0 In Mitchell v.
Couch,51 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky stated that the most
cogent reason for holding that a viable unborn child was an entity
within the meaning of the word "person" was that such a child was
a presently existing person and a living human being.52 To the
Mitchell court, the medical distinction between the term "embryo"
and the phrase "viable fetus" meant that a child has reached such
a state of development that it could presently live outside the fe-
male body as well as within it.'
The speculative nature of determining the viability of an unborn
fetus has been obviated by modern medicine.5 4 However, some
courts, in spite of the support of the medical profession in estab-
lishing that a viable unborn child has reached a state of prenatal
development where it is capable of independent life apart from its
mother, have refused to recognize a viable fetus as having a sepa-
rate existence.5 5 The result is an unjust denial of the viable unborn
child "person" status under the state's wrongful death statute.
The courts utilizing this type of analysis have found support in
policies which are equally unpersuasive. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals, in Cardwell v. Welch,5 was disturbed by the causation
(district court applying West Virginia state law).
49. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
51. 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955) (as a result of the defendant's negligence, the
plaintiff who was in the last stage of pregnancy was injured in a motor vehicle accident and
delivered a baby which was born dead two days later).
52. Id. at 905.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe court stated:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective
of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.
Id. at 163.
55. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 2S7 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 523
(1975) (defendant's negligence had caused a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death
1983 1025
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problems which would arise if a viable fetus was granted a wrong-
ful death cause of action.5 7 In resolving that an unborn viable child
was not a "person" within the meaning of the North Carolina
wrongful death statute, the court stated that from the moment of
conception onward, there must be some cut-off point; that to place
this at the moment of live birth has at least the merit of providing
some degree of certainty to an otherwise speculative situation."'
Such reasoning, however, is unconvincing, as noted by the Ala-
bama Supreme Court in Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores.59 The Eich
court concluded that in light of modern medical technology, proof
of the cause of death could be made by expert witnesses; the sub-
stantive rights resulting from wrongful death must be protected re-
gardless of the inherent practical difficulties; and that since the
burden of proof was on the plaintiff, any increased difficulty of
proof of causation would inure to the benefit of the defendant.6 0
Other courts, rejecting the contention that problems relating to
proof of causation justified denying the plaintiff's right of action,
have been substantially in accord with the view expressed in
Mitchell v. Couch. 1 In Mitchell, the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
noting that uncertainty of proof should not be grounds for destroy-
ing a legal right, said that the questions of causation and reasona-
ble certainty which arose in cases such as the present one were no
different from the causation problems which had arisen in
thousands of other negligence cases decided in the past."2
and stillbirth of a child approximately in its third trimester).
57. Id. at 393, 213 S.E.2d at 384.
58. Id.
59. 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974) (the plaintiff was eight and one half months
pregnant at the time of an automobile accident which resulted in the stillbirth of her fetal
child).
60. Id. at 100, 300 So. 2d at 358. The Alabama Supreme Court in Eich stated:
Concerning the problem of causation, we are not persuaded by the argument of ap-
pellee that a clear remedy for an injustice should be denied because a wrong is not
clearly prone to proof. We think that, in light of modern medical technology, proof of
the cause of death can be made by expert witnesses. Under our established law in
these cases, a verdict based on such expert testimony would not rest on pure specula-
tion, guesswork or conjecture.
Id.
61. 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955). See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
62. 285 S.W.2d at 906. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Mitchell stated:
Such difficulty of proof is not special to this particular kind of action; and it is beside
the point, anyhow, in determining whether such an action is maintainable. Every day
in our trial courts and before administrative tribunals, particularly the Workmen's
Compensation Board, such issues are disposed of, and in the eyes of the law it is a
wrongful concept that uncertainty of proof can ever destroy a legal right.
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Courts have also held that the difficulty in proving damages suf-
fered by a viable fetus is sufficient reason to deny a cause of ac-
tion. 3 There is no competent means of measuring the probable fu-
ture earnings of the fetus and it is virtually impossible to predict
whether an unborn child, but for its death, would have been capa-
ble of giving pecuniary benefit to anyone. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court, in Gay v. Thompson," stated that there could be no
evidence from which to infer "pecuniary injury" resulting from the
wrongful death of a viable fetus."5 Any and all calculations as to
damages would be sheer speculation."
This view finds little support, however, throughout the majority
of the states. Most of the courts have contended that the weight to
be given to various elements of damage is a determination for the
trier of the case on the merits. 7 It is certainly not a factor affecting
the right to maintain the action. In addition, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court, in Evans v. Olson,68 noting that recovery was limited
to pecuniary loss under Oklahoma law and that punitive damages
were not permissible, said that it found no more speculation as to
the probablility of pecuniary loss with a stillborn child than with a
63. See Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Gay v. Thomp-
son, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d
382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975); Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d
959 (1981); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966).
64. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
65. Id. at 400, 146 S.E.2d at 429.
66. Id. at 398, 146 S.E.2d at 428. The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Gay, com-
menting upon the uncertainty in predicting damages, said:
None of the usual indicia such as mental and physical capabilities, personality traits,
aptitudes and training of the wrongfully killed are present. While it is true that the
social position of the parents may constitute a slight unit of measure, the probable
future earnings of a stillborn fetus are patently a matter of sheer speculation.
Id. (quoting Comment, Development in the Law of Prenatal Wrongful Death, 69 DicK. L.
Rav. 258, 267 (1965)).
67. See Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Hatala v.
Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55
Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88, (1973); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); Mone
v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich.
130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Evans v.
Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636
(1974); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash.
2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W..Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971);
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967). See
also Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964) (circuit court applying Vir-
ginia state law).
68. 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976) (parent-plaintiffs brought suit against two physicians
and a hospital for the wrongful death of their stillborn child).
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five year, four year, two year or one month old child. 9 The court
stated that damage awards for the deaths of such young children
had been upheld in previous Oklahoma decisions and that the
same reasoning should be applied in cases involving viable
fetuses.7"
State courts have also held that the real objective of bringing an
action under a wrongful death statute for the death of an unborn
child is to compensate the survivors, particularly the child's par-
ents, for their emotional distress.7 1 These states assert that neither
the wrongful death acts nor the survival statutes contemplated or
ever intended to include a claim by a fetus injured in utero, and
that any mental anguish suffered by the mother may be recovered
in her own independent action. Contrary to this contention, how-
ever, is the more persuasive Moen v. Hanson7 2 decision, in which
the Washington Supreme Court rejected the premise that permit-
ting a claim for the death of an unborn viable fetus would result in
double recovery.73 The Moen court held that the damages pertain-
ing to the respective claims were separate and distinct, just as they
are in the event of the tortious loss of a postnatal child and its
mother."
The issues, as revealed by a comparison of the state decisions,
are extremely well-defined. The arguments advanced in favor of
denying a viable fetus a cause of action are refined and very pre-
cise. They have been echoed throughout the states refusing a right
of action primarily as a matter of stare decisis. However, each ar-
gument presented in support of denying a cause of action has been
addressed and refuted by the majority of courts with better legal
69. Id. at 928.
70. Id.
71. See Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C.
464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975); Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981); Marko v. Phila-
delphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d
9 (1964).
72. 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975) (the unborn child due to be delivered within
30 days was killed in an automobile collision as a result of the defendant's negligence).
73. Id. at 600, 537 P.2d at 267.
74. Id. The Moen court reasoned:
It is argued, for example, that permitting a claim for the death of an unborn viable
fetus will result in a double recovery, because recovery may also be allowed for the
wrongful death or injury of the mother, which by itself should be ample compensa-
tion. We cannot agree with this contention for the reason that the possibility of re-
covery by way of a separate claim for the death or injury of a mother carrying a
viable fetus does not recognize and compensate for the mental anguish and suffering
undeniably flowing from the death of a viable fetus.
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reasoning and logic, consequently resulting in more just decisions.
Every premise relied upon by the minority view has been resound-
ingly attacked and criticized by a majority of well-reasoned opin-
ions. Pennsylvania, a victim.of stare decisis, continues in the tradi-
tion of the minority and offers little in support of its present
position.
IV. THE PENNSYLVANIA POSITION
In Pennsylvania there is presently no cause of action for a still-
born child who has died as a result of injuries received en ventre sa
mere. Justice Flaherty recently reiterated this position in Scott v.
Kopp.7 5 In Scott, a viable fetus, negligently injured in utero and
subsequently stillborn, was denied a cause of action under the
Pennsylvania wrongful death76 and survival Acts.7 Justice Fla-
herty relied upon the precedent established by Carroll v. Skloffp
and Marko v. Philadelphia Transportation Co. 79 in arriving at his
opinion. The Scott court, citing Marko, stated that the real objec-
tive of a lawsuit on behalf of the stillborn child is to compensate
the parents of the deceased for emotional distress.80 The court
noted that a mother was not without a remedy because she could
sue in her own individual capacity for mental anguish if it was ac-
companied by or resulted from physical injury.81 Justice Flaherty
stated that neither the Pennsylvania wrongful death Act nor the
survival statute was ever intended to include a claim for emotional
distress.
8 2
This logic, however, fails for a number of reasons. Wrongful
death and survival actions, as a practical matter, compensate those
who are entitled to recover under the acts for the emotional dis-
tress they suffer as a result of a loved one's death. Pecuniary loss
awarded under the wrongful death and survival statutes encom-
75. 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court voted four to
two in favor of denying a viable fetus a cause of action in Scott. Justice Larsen filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Kauffman joined.
76. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1982).
77. Id. § 8302.
78. 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964) (father-plaintiff of the unborn child filed a claim
against the defendant physician alleging that the doctor negligently killed an infant in utero
within ten weeks of gestation).
79. 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966) (plaintiff's wife was six months pregnant with a
viable child when she was electrocuted while a passenger of the defendant's trolley which
resulted in the death of the fetus).
80. 494 Pa. at 489, 431 A.2d at 960.
81. Id. at 489-90, 431 A.2d at 960-61.
82. Id. at 489, 431 A.2d at 960.
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passes a variety of damages. Loss of services, society, companion-
ship, and comfort are all compensable under the state statutes.83
Thus, although the language of the Pennsylvania Acts does not
specifically allow for recovery of emotional distress, to a certain ex-
tent compensation for the mental anguish experienced by the sur-
vivors is implicit in the very nature of the remedy. It is unpersua-
sive, therefore, to state that a cause of action does not exist simply
because recovery for emotional distress was never explicitly pro-
vided for in the wrongful death and survival statutes or that emo-
tional distress is compensated in other types of actions brought by
the plaintiffs.
The real objective of a lawsuit brought on behalf of a stillborn
child, however, is not to recover for the parents' emotional distress,
but to compensate them for the pecuniary loss they suffer as a re-
sult of their child's death, including loss of society. As is the case
in any wrongful death and survival action, the parents seek to re-
cover all the elements of damages allowable under the acts; for ex-
ample, the amount of money the stillborn child would have con-
tributed to the benefit of those entitled to recover under the
statute during the decedent's lifetime, and all of the money the
decedent would have earned and accumulated to his own benefit,
in addition to medical, funeral, and burial expenses.8 4
The courts of Pennsylvania contend that a viable fetus who is
negligently injured in utero and is stillborn has no claim to these
elements of damages. Pennsylvania grants a cause of action, how-
ever, to a child who is born alive and then dies moments after
birth.8 5 Certainly a child who lives for but a moment does not have
a more legitimate claim to these damages than a viable fetus. The
present Pennsylvania position adheres to the proposition that a
lawsuit filed on behalf of a child who lives for a minute is not
83. See Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor Exp., 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d
490 (1959) (companionship, comfort, society, guidance, solace, and protection afforded by
wife for family are compensable under wrongful death act).
84. See Wetzel v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Under
Pennsylvania law, wrongful death action damages may be recovered for hospital, nursing,
medical and funeral expenses. Under the survival act, a decedent's estate may recover dam-
ages for decedent's pain and suffering; loss of decedent's earnings from date of death to trial
less probable cost of maintenance for himself and dependents; and present worth of future
loss of decedent's earnings through life expectancy less probable cost of maintenance). See
also Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980) (in awarding damages for
future lost earnings it is no longer necessary to reduce the amount to present value).
85. 494 Pa. at 490-91, 431 A.2d at 961-62. The Scott court stated: "[an] infant who is
injured while in existence as a fetus may recover if it survives birth, eo instanti, whereas the
representatives could not recover if the infant were stillborn." Id. at 491, 431 A.2d 961.
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brought to recover for the parents' emotional distress. The require-
ment of live birth somehow automatically divests the cause of ac-
tion from its implications of compensating solely for emotional dis-
tress and that after birth all the elements of damage under the
death statutes are proper. This reasoning is erroneous. An infant
who momentarily survives birth has no more pecuniary value and
provides no more comfort, society, or companionship than a viable
fetus. For purposes of recovery under the Pennsylvania wrongful
death and survival Acts, a viable fetus and a newborn infant are
indistinguishable and thus should be treated accordingly.
In the Scott decision, however, Justice Flaherty, relying upon
Carroll v. Skloif,86 noted that survival actions were strictly deriva-
tive and could not stand without an independent life in being, sur-
viving birth, which could have brought the action prior to death.87
In support of this premise, the majority defended the "live birth"
requirement by stating that the adoption of a viability requirement
would only relocate the difficulty and increase the problems of cau-
sation.88 Live birth, according to Justice Flaherty, has the advan-
tage of providing some legal assurances that there was a living per-
son in existence.89 In response to the majority's argument, it may
be asserted that the defintion of a viable fetus is an independent
life in being, which is therefore capable of bringing an action prior
to death.90
The very essence of a survival action is to grant the personal
representative of the decedent the cause of action which would
have been maintainable by the decedent had he lived. 9' Under
Pennsylvania law, a viable fetus which is negligently injured in
utero and is born with a defect is allowed a cause of action to re-
cover the damages the infant incurred en ventre sa mere.95 There-
86. 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
87. 494 Pa. at 490, 431 A.2d at 961.
88. Id. at 491, 431 A.2d at 961-62.
89. Id. at 491-92, 431 A.2d at 962. The Scott court stated:
Requiring a live birth has the advantage of establishing to a legal certainty that there
was a living person in existence, thereby bringing any survival or wrongful death ac-
tion into conformity with other similar actions brought by persons or the representa-
tives of persons who died as a result of wrongful or negligent injuries inflicted by
another.
Id.
90. See supra notes 7 & 16 and accompanying text.
91. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (Purdon 1982).
92. See Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960). The Sinkler court granted
a cause of action to an infant who was born a Mongoloid as a result of injuries sustained in
utero in an automobile collision. Id. at 274, 164 A.2d at 96.
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fore, an action does exist for the viable fetus which should survive
its death. The majority in Scott, however, attempted to distinguish
and justify a cause of action on the part of a deformed or handi-
capped child by arguing that the responsibility of the parents is
increased and/or the child may become a charge upon society."
This logic is nowhere reflected in the statutory scheme and is in-
consistent with the allowance of any survival and wrongful death
actions. The result of this interpretation is unacceptable. A
tortfeasor should not be rewarded for killing his victim as opposed
to simply injuring him. It was this very injustice that legislatures
sought to correct when enacting wrongful death and survival stat-
utes.' 4 These acts were legislatively created to permit recovery for
a wrong which had no remedy. It is contrary to the legislative pur-
pose of the wrongful death and survival acts to contend that there
is no recovery for death simply because there is no continued bur-
den to others or possibility of a future charge to society.'
5
Justice Flaherty's concern with problems of causation is also
misplaced. The difficulty in proving causation and pecuniary loss
should not affect the right to bring a cause of action.' The Scott
court was guilty of confusing evidentiary problems with causes of
action. The two concepts are separate and distinct. Simply because
causation may be difficult to prove and damages are difficult to
value does not mean that a wrong has not been committed for
which there should be a remedy.
Problems of causation may be dealt with as they normally are,
through expert testimony. The courts have allowed expert testi-
mony to resolve complicated causation questions in medical mal-
practice and products liability cases.97 There is no reason why ex-
pert medical witnesses could not competently testify as to
questions of viability and causation in stillborn cases. It is a ques-
tion of fact to be discerned from the testimony of experts and re-
solved by the jury. As is the case in many situations in which the
law requires expert witnesses, where the burden of proof of causa-
93. 494 Pa. at 491, 431 A.2d at 961.
94. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 902.
95. The purpose of the wrongful death and survival acts is to compensate those who
have lost the services of the decedent. See id. at 901.
96. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
97. See Steele v. Shepperd, 411 Pa. 481, 192 A.2d 397 (1963) (qualified expert may be
permitted to assert relevant fact not generally known but known to him because of his spe-
cial training and experience); Kubit v. Russ, 287 Pa. Super. 28, 429 A.2d 703 (1981) (expert
testimony is admissible when it involves explanations and inferences not within the ordinary
training, knowledge, intelligence and experience of jury).
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tion is not met by qualified expert testimony, those actions should
be dismissed. However, complex causation issues should not invali-
date all those causes of action for which medical expert testimony
could be successfully employed."
The difficulty in proving pecuniary loss as an element of damage
is equally unpersuasive as a reason for denying a cause of action.
Pennsylvania, as noted previously, grants a cause of action under
the wrongful death and survival Acts to an infant who survives
birth and subsequently dies." The method of valuing pecuniary
loss is identical in the case of a stillborn child, an infant, a one
year old, a two year old, and so forth. Because the stillborn child or
infant obviously has no career earnings upon which to base a com-
putation, such factors as the educational background of the par-
ents, brothers and sisters, the financial status of the family, and
the parents' and siblings' occupations are taken into considera-
tion.100 It is illogical, therefore, to grant a cause of action to an
infant and compute the pecuniary loss, while denying a cause of
action to a stillborn due to the difficulty in proving the exact same
pecuniary damages.
Medical science has advanced to such a degree that the viability
of a fetus may be readily determined.' 0 ' A viable fetus is a living
person with a separate existence apart from its mother and having
a distinct legal personality. 0 2 Justice Flaherty's contention that
live birth is required to obtain certainty 03 is an antiquated notion
in light of the state of modern medicine. Expert medical testimony
is capable of establishing viability within a degree of medical cer-
tainty. It must be remembered that viability is not a legal question
to be resolved by judges and lawyers. It is, rather, a medical deter-
mination to be protected by the judicial system. Thus, it is error to
assume that live birth is necessary to establish with certainty a life
with a separate legal existence.
Pennsylvania's present position, as expressed in Scott, is also in-
consistent with the development of the state's own tort law. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Hamil v. Bashline, °" held that a
defendant would be liable if his negligence increased the risk of
98. 494 Pa. at 496, 431 A.2d at 964. (Larsen, J., dissenting).
99. See supra note 96.
100. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF DAMAGES 353-54 (1935).
101. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
103. 494 Pa. at 491-92, 431 A.2d at 962.
104. 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978). See supra note 7.
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harm to the plaintiff. 05 If there was any substantial possibility of
survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable." 6
The medical expert in Hamil testified that the plaintiff's decedent
had a certain percentage chance of survival which was terminated
by the defendant's negligence.10 7 The supreme court decided that
the plaintiff's expert testimony was sufficient to establish causa-
tion.10 8 The testimony of the medical expert stating that the defen-
dant's negligence terminated the plaintiff's decedent's chances of
survival met the burden of proof necessary to submit the question
of causation to the jury.109 The identical situation exists in the case
of a death of an unborn viable fetus. Medical expert testimony
could easily be introduced to establish a viable fetus' chances of
survival before the intervention of the defendant's negligence.
Once testimony has been given that the fetus had a substantial
possibility to be born alive and that the negligent conduct of the
tortfeasor had destroyed that possibility, the defendant should be
subject to liability consistent with Pennsylvania law.
V. CONCLUSION
The opinion rendered in Scott v. Kopp, simply stated, is incon-
gruous with the realities of modern medicine, the overwhelming
weight of authority, and Pennsylvania state law. It is no longer
plausible, in light of the sophistication of medicine, to insist that a
viable fetus, which is capable of living an existence independent of
its mother, is not a person under wrongful death and survival stat-
utes. Viability, as had been noted throughout the state court deci-
sions, may easily be ascertained through the use of expert medical
testimony. Thus, once it has been established that a fetus is a bio-
logically existing person and a living human being, the unborn
child should be entitled to all the rights afforded a person under
the wrongful death and survival statutes.110
105. 481 Pa. at 262, 392 A.2d at 1283.
106. Id. at 272, 392 A.2d at 1288 (citing Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th
Cir. 1968)).
107. Id. at 263, 392 A.2d at 1283. In Hamil, the medical expert outlined the use of
beds, oxygen, and pain relieving drugs in the treatment of chest pains. He then expressed
his professional medical opinion that had the defendant physician employed the methods of
treatment he had described, the plaintiff's decedent would have had a 75% chance of sur-
viving his heart attack. In the plaintiff's expert's opinion, the decedent's chances of recovery
were terminated by the defendant's negligence. Id.
108. Id. at 274, 392 A.2d at 1289.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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As a result of this conclusion, the corollary issues raised by the
minority of courts which deny a cause of action fail to reach a level
of legal reasoning pursuasive enough to prevent the statute's oper-
ation. The vast majority of courts have addressed these issues and
have effectively refuted each argument. Questions including judi-
cial power to grant a cause of action, possible fraudulent claims,
causation, and speculative damages have all been answered by the
state courts granting a viable fetus a right of recovery under their
state's wrongful death and/or survival statutes.'' None of the the-
ories advanced in support of denying a cause of action have been
avoided or ignored. Pennsylvania, in the Scott decision, offers
nothing new in the way of persuasive argument which has not been
previously asserted and controverted. Justice Flaherty relies heav-
ily on stare decisis without providing an analysis which considers
in any depth the present state of Pennsylvania's own tort law. In
Pennsylvania, a child who is negligently injured in utero and is
born with a defect or momentarily lives is granted a cause of ac-
tion. There should be no difference in liability whether or not the
child survives birth. This argument is best illustrated in the case of
twins where one is born alive but because of prenatal injuries dies
within a few hours, and the other because of the same injuries is
stillborn. The inequity and illogic is evident in permitting a cause
of action for wrongful death and survival in the case of the twin
who is born alive but dies within a few hours and denying such an
action on behalf of the stillborn." '
The real injustice, however, is evidenced by the attitude of the
Scott court which addresses the negligent acts causing the death of
an unborn viable fetus as a "wrong, if any.""' It is difficult to im-
agine that the parents of a child stillborn as a result of a
tortfeasor's negligence would agree that there has been no
"wrong." It may be time for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
become more sensitive to the realities of contemporary society and
fulfill their obligation to reconcile authority with reason.14 Penn-
sylvania is compelled by the overwhelming weight of authority and
reason to grant a remedy under the wrongful death and survival
111. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
112. See Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Stidam v.
Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431,
184 S.E.2d 428 (1971).
113. 494 Pa. at 492, 431 A.2d at 962. Justice Flaherty stated in Scott: "The wrong, if
any, in a case such as the present one is to the parents of the stillborn child. . . ." Id.
114. Pound, What is the Common Law, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 176, 186 (1937).
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acts where there has certainly been a wrong to a viable fetus which
has been negligently injured in utero and subsequently stillborn.
Regis Myles McClelland
